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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
I. 
 
Plaintiff-Appellants are investors who purchased and sold 
securities on the NASDAQ market, the major electronic 
market for "over-the-counter" securities, during the two 
year period from November 4, 1992 to November 4, 1994 
("the class period"). The defendants are NASDAQ market 
makers. NASDAQ is a self-regulating market owned by the 
National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), subject 
to oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
("SEC"). 
 
An "over-the-counter" market like NASDAQ differs in 
important respects from the more familiar auction markets, 
like the New York and American Stock Exchanges. The 
NYSE and AMEX markets are distinguished by a physical 
exchange floor where buy and sell orders actually"meet," 
with prices set by the interaction of those orders under the 
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supervision of a market "specialist." In a dealer market like 
NASDAQ, the market exists electronically, in the form of a 
communications system which constantly receives and 
reports the prices at which geographically dispersed market 
makers are willing to buy and sell different securities. 
These market makers compete with one another to buy and 
sell the same securities using the electronic system; 
NASDAQ is, then, an electronic inter-dealer quotation 
system. 
 
In a dealer market, market makers create liquidity by 
being continuously willing to buy and sell the security in 
which they are making a market. In this way, an individual 
who wishes to buy or sell a security does not have to wait 
until someone is found who wishes to take the opposite 
side in the desired transaction. To account for the effort 
and risk required to maintain liquidity, market makers are 
allowed to set the prices at which they are prepared to buy 
and sell a particular security; the difference between the 
listed "ask" and "bid" prices is the"spread" that market 
makers capture as compensation. 
 
The electronic quotation system ties together the 
numerous market makers for all over-the-counter securities 
available on NASDAQ. All NASDAQ market makers are 
required to input their bid and offer prices to the NASD 
computer, which collects the information and transmits, for 
each security, the highest bid price and lowest ask price 
currently available. These prices are called the"National 
Best Bid and Offer," or NBBO. The NASD computer, 
publicly available to all NASDAQ market makers, brokers 
and dealers, displays and continuously updates the NBBO 
for each offered security. 
 
Plaintiffs allege that technological advances made it 
feasible during the class period for the defendant market 
makers to execute orders at prices quoted on private on- 
line services like SelectNet and Instinet and that those 
prices were frequently more favorable to their investor 
clients than the NBBO price. According to plaintiffs, the 
defendants regularly used these services and knew that 
prices better than NBBO were often available through them. 
Even though they knew that their investor clients expected 
them to secure the best reasonably available price, 
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plaintiffs say, the defendants executed plaintiffs' orders at 
the NBBO price when they knew that price was inferior and 
when they, at the same time, were trading at the more 
favorable price for their own accounts. In this way, they 
were able to inflate their profit margins at the expense of 
their investor clients. This practice is alleged to violate 
section 10 of the Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.S 78j, 
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. 
S 240.10b-5. 
 
The plaintiffs also charge defendants with two other 
violations of section 10 and Rule 10b-5. Market makers 
who simultaneously hold a market order for both sides of a 
transaction may obtain more favorable prices than the 
NBBO by "crossing" these in-house orders. Transactions 
handled in this way are executed within the spread, giving 
both the purchaser and seller a better price. Similarly, a 
customer order can be matched by a market maker with an 
in-house limit order on the other side of the transaction. 
Since a limit order specifies a particular price at which to 
execute a transaction, matching another customer order at 
that price may beat the currently displayed NBBO quote for 
that security. Plaintiffs allege that the failure of the 
defendants to execute orders of their clients in these ways 
when feasible constitutes a fraudulent practice because, by 
executing at the NBBO rather than matching customer 
orders, the defendants capture the full market "spread" as 
a fee for their services without incurring any actual risk in 
the transaction. 
 
II. 
 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. At the 
direction of the district court, this motion was converted 
into a motion for summary judgment, which was ultimately 
granted. See In re Merrill Lynch Securities Litigation, 911 F. 
Supp. 754 (D.N.J. 1995). The district court rested its 
decision on two principal grounds. First, the court 
determined that the defendants made no misrepresentation. 
Though recognizing that the defendants, by accepting 
plaintiffs' orders, impliedly represented that they intended 
to execute those orders in conformity with the "duty of best 
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execution," the court considered the scope of this duty 
sufficiently ill-defined that execution at the NBBO could 
not, as a matter of law, be found inconsistent with the 
duty. The court concluded that in the face of uncertainty 
about the scope of defendants' duty of best execution, 
holding them liable would be "highly imprudent." 911 F. 
Supp. at 771. Second, the court held that, even if 
defendants made a material misrepresentation, they could 
not, as a matter of law, have acted with the requisite 
scienter. 
 
To state a claim for securities fraud under S 10 of the 
Securities Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, plaintiffs must 
demonstrate: (1) a misrepresentation or omission of a 
material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
security; (2) scienter on the part of the defendant; (3) 
reliance on the misrepresentation; and (4) damage resulting 
from the misrepresentation. See Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, 
Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 296 (3d Cir. 1991). Because plaintiffs 
have demonstrated that a genuine issue of material fact 
exists as to the elements of their securities fraud claim, we 
will reverse the district court. 
 
III. 
 
The parties agree that a broker-dealer owes to the client 
a duty of best execution. They further agree that a broker- 
dealer, by accepting an order without price instructions, 
impliedly represents that the order will be executed in a 
manner consistent with the duty of best execution and that 
a broker-dealer who accepts such an order while intending 
to breach that duty makes a misrepresentation that is 
material to the purchase or sale. The parties differ, 
however, on whether a trier of fact could conclude from this 
record that the implied representation made by the 
defendants included a representation that they would not 
execute at the NBBO price when prices more favorable to 
the client were available from sources like SelectNet and 
Instinet. 
 
As we explain hereafter, this difference can be resolved 
only by determining whether, during the class period or 
some portion thereof, it was feasible for the defendants to 
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execute trades through SelectNet and Instinet when prices 
more favorable than the NBBO were being quoted there. 
This is a matter concerning which the record reflects a 
material dispute of fact. If such prices were reasonably 
available and the defendants, at the time of accepting 
plaintiffs' orders, intended to execute them solely by 
reference to the NBBO, they made a material 
misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale 
of the securities involved. If a finder of fact could infer, in 
addition, that the defendants' implied representation was 
knowingly false or made with reckless indifference, it would 
follow that summary judgment for the defendants was 
inappropriate. 
 
The duty of best execution, which predates the federal 
securities laws, has its roots in the common law agency 
obligations of undivided loyalty and reasonable care that an 
agent owes to his principal.1 Since it is understood by all 
that the client-principal seeks his own economic gain and 
the purpose of the agency is to help the client-principal 
achieve that objective, the broker-dealer, absent 
instructions to the contrary, is expected to use reasonable 
efforts to maximize the economic benefit to the client in 
each transaction. 
 
The duty of best execution thus requires that a broker- 
dealer seek to obtain for its customer orders the most 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See, e.g., Hall v. Paine, 112 N.E. 153, 158 (Mass. 1916) ("broker's 
obligation to his principal requires him to secure the highest price 
obtainable"); Restatement of Agency (Second)S 424 (1958) (agent must 
"use reasonable care to obtain terms which best satisfy the manifested 
purposes of the principal"). See also Opper v. Hancock Securities Corp., 
250 F.Supp. 668, 676 (S.D.N.Y.) ("[T]he duties of a securities broker are, 
if anything, more stringent than those imposed by general agency law."), 
aff 'd, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966). Moreover, as the district court 
correctly recognized, the best execution duty "does not dissolve when the 
broker/dealer acts in its capacity as a principal." 911 F.Supp. at 760. 
Accord E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Rel. No. 25887, 49 S.E.C. 829, 
832 (1988) ("A broker-dealer's determination to execute an order as 
principal or agent cannot be `a means by which the broker may elect 
whether or not the law will impose fiduciary standards upon him in the 
actual circumstances of any given relationship or transaction.' ") 
(citation 
omitted). 
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favorable terms reasonably available under the 
circumstances. See, e.g., Sinclair v. SEC, 444 F.2d 399, 400 
(2d Cir. 1971) (fiduciary duty requires broker-dealer "to 
obtain the best available price" for customers' orders); 
Arleen W. Hughes, 27 S.E.C. 629, 636 (1948) ("A corollary 
of the fiduciary's duty of loyalty to his principal is his duty 
to obtain . . . the best price discoverable in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence."), aff 'd sub nom. Hughes v. SEC, 174 
F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949). Accord Order Execution 
Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 37,619A, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 48290, 48322 (Sept. 12, 1996) ("Final Rules"). That is, 
the duty of best execution requires the defendants to 
execute the plaintiffs' trades at the best reasonably 
available price.2 While ascertaining what prices are 
reasonably available in any particular situation may require 
a factual inquiry into all of the surrounding circumstances, 
the existence of a broker-dealer's duty to execute at the 
best of those prices that are reasonably available is well- 
established and is not so vague as to be without 
ascertainable content in the context of a particular trade or 
trades. 
 
As the SEC has recognized on a number of occasions, the 
scope of the duty of best execution has evolved over time 
with changes in technology and transformation of the 
structure of financial markets.3 For example, before the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Other terms in addition to price are also relevant to best execution. 
In 
determining how to execute a client's order, a broker-dealer must take 
into account order size, trading characteristics of the security, speed of 
execution, clearing costs, and the cost and difficulty of executing an 
order in a particular market. See, e.g., Payment for Order Flow, 
Exchange Act Release No. 33,026, 58 Fed. Reg. 52934, 52937-38 (Oct. 
13, 1993). When the plaintiffs state that better"prices" were reasonably 
available from sources other than the NBBO, we understand that to 
mean that, given an evaluation of price as well as all of the other 
relevant terms, the trade would be better executed through a source of 
liquidity other than the NBBO (e.g. SelectNet, Instinet, in-house limit 
orders or market orders held by the defendants, or limit orders placed by 
the public in the Small Order Execution System). Similarly, for 
convenience, we use the phrases "best reasonably available price" and 
"best terms" interchangeably. 
 
3. See, e.g., Final Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. at 48322-23 ("The scope of this 
duty of best execution must evolve as changes occur in the market that 
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creation of NASDAQ, a broker in an over-the-counter 
market satisfied her duty of best execution by contacting at 
least three market makers prior to executing a client's 
order. See Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act 
Release No. 36,310, 60 Fed. Reg. 52792, 52793 (Oct. 10, 
1995) ("Proposed Rules"). With the advent of NASDAQ and 
the NBBO computer system providing instant access to the 
best bid and offer available nationwide, the standard for 
satisfying the duty of best execution necessarily heightened. 
After the class period, the SEC issued rules that altered the 
definition of the NBBO to include consideration of many of 
the alternative sources of liquidity that plaintiffs claim 
should have been consulted during the class period, such 
as SelectNet and Instinet. See Final Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. at 
48306-16. Prospectively, at least, this heightened the 
standard still further. 
 
Because the scope of the duty of best execution is 
constantly evolving and because the "reasonably available" 
component of the duty is fact dependent, broker-dealers 
have long been required to conform customer order 
practices with changes in technology and markets. For 
example, the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice, adopted in 
1968, required brokers in the over-the-counter market to 
"use reasonable diligence to ascertain the best inter-dealer 
market for the subject security and buy or sell in such 
market so that the resultant price to the customer is as 
favorable as possible under the prevailing market 
conditions." NASD Manual (CCH), art. III S 1, P 2151.03 
(1995) (Interpretation A). Included in the factors used to 
satisfy the requirement of "reasonable diligence" are both 
"the number of primary markets checked," and the 
"location and accessibility to the customer's broker-dealer 
of primary markets and quotations sources." Id. 
 
Almost a year before the end of the class period, the SEC 
staff issued a report entitled "Market 2000: An Examination 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
give rise to improved executions for customer orders, including 
opportunities to trade at more advantageous prices. As these changes 
occur, broker-dealers' procedures for seeking to obtain best execution for 
customer orders also must be modified to consider price opportunities 
that become `reasonably available.' "). 
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of Current Equity Market Developments." This report notes 
that the SEC has consistently taken the position that the 
evolving nature of the markets requires a broker-dealer to 
"periodically assess the quality of competing markets to 
ensure that its order flow is directed to markets providing 
the most advantageous terms for the customer's order." 
Market 2000 Report, 1994 SEC LEXIS 136, *11-12. As the 
term "periodically assess" suggests and as the SEC 
confirms in its amicus briefing before us, this segment of 
the report was not speaking to the issue of whether, during 
the class period, the duty of best execution included a 
requirement that broker-dealers engage in an order-by- 
order analysis of competing markets. It does, however, 
expressly recognize a duty on the part of broker-dealers to 
periodically examine their practices in light of market and 
technology changes and to modify those practices if 
necessary to enable their clients to obtain the best 
reasonably available prices. 
 
The plaintiffs' orders did not specify the price at which 
they should be executed. It is a reasonable inference that 
plaintiffs, in placing their orders, sought their own 
economic advantage and that they would not have placed 
them without an understanding that the defendants would 
execute them in a manner that would maximize plaintiffs' 
economic benefit from the trade. Given the objective of the 
agency and the regulatory background we have reviewed, 
we conclude that a trier of fact could infer that the 
defendants' acceptance of the orders was reasonably 
understood as a representation that they would not be 
executed at the NBBO price when better prices were 
reasonably available elsewhere. Accordingly, we must 
examine the record evidence relevant to whether prices 
quoted on private on-line services like SelectNet and 
Instinet were reasonably available during the class period 
and whether those prices were more favorable than the 
NBBO when plaintiffs' orders were executed. 
 
The evidence pointed to by plaintiffs indicates that (1) 
SelectNet and Instinet were in existence throughout the 
class period; (2) the quotations reported by these services 
reflected buyers and sellers ready to trade at the quoted 
prices; (3) the defendants themselves actively traded on 
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SelectNet and Instinet during the class period; and (4) other 
respected members of the brokerage community, since 
before the class period, have regarded these services as 
providing reasonably available prices and have executed 
orders through them when the prices reported were more 
favorable to the client than the NBBO price. In addition, the 
plaintiffs have tendered expert testimony confirming the 
reasonable availability of execution sources other than the 
NBBO during the class period. 
 
With respect to whether SelectNet and Instinet prices 
were more favorable at the time their orders were executed, 
plaintiffs point to an SEC study of prices during the three 
month period from April through June 1994. The SEC 
found that "approximately 85% of the bids and offers 
displayed by market makers in Instinet and 90% of the bids 
and offers displayed on SelectNet were at better prices than 
those posted publicly on NASDAQ." Final Rules, 61 Fed. 
Reg. at 48308. Plaintiffs have also tendered evidence of a 
few trades executed for them by defendants at the NBBO 
where evidence of contemporaneous offers on Instinet and 
SelectNet indicate that lower prices were available. Plaintiffs 
have filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit indicating that they need 
discovery in order to provide similar evidence with respect 
to the remainder of their trades.4 
 
To be sure, the defendants, with record support, insist 
that consulting other sources besides the NBBO would 
have added substantial expense and delay to the execution 
of plaintiffs' orders, more than offsetting any improvements 
that might have been available in terms of price. 5 This, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Defendants suggest that the lack of evidence of injury in all 
plaintiffs' 
transactions supports an affirmance on the basis of lack of standing. We 
believe the evidence we have reviewed in text supports plaintiffs' claim 
to 
standing. Plaintiffs submitted evidence that would warrant a finding that 
several trades were made on their behalf when better prices were 
contemporaneously available from other sources. The SEC study of 1994 
prices suggests that, more likely than not, there were other trades in 
this 
category. In any event, the plaintiffs have filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit 
that 
would preclude a summary judgment for defendants on this issue at this 
time. 
 
5. In particular, the defendants rely upon the existence during the class 
period of the Small Order Execution System ("SOES"). SOES is an 
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however, does nothing more than create a material dispute 
of fact which we are not permitted to resolve in favor of the 
defendants at this juncture. 
 
We believe the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable 
trier of fact to conclude that, by the time of the class 
period, both technology and over-the-counter markets had 
developed to a point where it was feasible to maximize the 
economic benefit to the client by taking advantage of better 
prices than the NBBO. Summary judgment for defendants 
on this element of plaintiffs' claim was therefore not 
appropriate. 
 
IV. 
 
As we have noted, recovery on a federal securities fraud 
claim requires a showing of scienter: a deliberate or 
reckless misrepresentation of a material fact. See Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976); Eisenberg v. 
Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 776 (3d Cir. 1985). The alleged 
misrepresentation here is an implied representation made 
by the defendants when they agreed to execute the 
plaintiffs' orders that they intended to maximize the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
electronic routing system that was created in 1984 to allow orders from 
small investors to be automatically executed at the NBBO. Defendants 
claim that since the NBBO was the exclusive source for trades executed 
through SOES, the duty of best execution was presumptively met for 
these trades. The evidence to which the defendants point supports their 
position that execution at the NBBO was a common practice in handling 
orders from small investors. It does not alone, however, require a finding 
that trades at better prices through SelectNet or Instinet were not 
reasonably available even for small orders or that a broker-dealer's duty 
of best execution was automatically discharged by executions through 
SOES. While size is undoubtedly a relevant factor in determining the 
scope of the duty of best execution, for summary judgment purposes we 
find the state of the record with respect to small orders no different 
than 
the record with respect to other orders. The affidavit of Richard Y. 
Roberts, who served as the chairman of the SEC throughout the class 
period, notes that, to his knowledge, the SEC did not take the position 
that execution through SOES automatically satisfied the duty of best 
execution, and indicates that, in his opinion, such a position would be 
contrary to several SEC releases. At any rate, not all of plaintiffs' 
orders 
were executed through SOES. 
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plaintiffs' economic gain in the transaction. Since the 
defendants knew of the plaintiffs' profit motivation, they 
must have understood, according to the plaintiffs, that 
plaintiffs would expect them to obtain a price more 
advantageous to the plaintiffs than the NBBO when one 
was readily available. If the defendants intended not to act 
in a manner consistent with this expectation when they 
accepted the orders and yet did not so advise plaintiffs, 
plaintiffs insist that the defendants can be found to have 
made an implied representation that they knew to be false. 
 
We believe that a reasonable trier of fact couldfind this 
chain of inferences persuasive based on a straight forward 
economic analysis of the plaintiffs' relationship with the 
defendants. In addition, however, plaintiffs rely upon 
evidence showing that respected members of the brokerage 
community recognized, even prior to the class period, that 
trades were readily available from sources other than the 
NBBO and that their clients expected them to take 
advantage of those sources whenever it would benefit the 
client. See, e.g., Declaration of Paul M. Lacy [A 718]; 
Declaration of Junius W. Peake [A 755]; Declaration of 
Richard Y. Roberts [A 775]. Moreover, the plaintiffs have 
shown that an SEC study found clear evidence of a two- 
tiered market during the class period, in which NASDAQ 
market makers routinely traded at one price with retail 
clients like the plaintiffs and at a better price for 
themselves through quotation services like SelectNet and 
Instinet. See Final Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. at 48307-08. They 
have further shown that the possibility that the duty of best 
execution might require resort to sources other than the 
NBBO was being actively debated during the class period 
and that that debate ultimately resulted, shortly after the 
class period, in a regulation effectively requiring as much. 
Id. 
 
All of this would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find 
that the defendants' misrepresentation--namely, that they 
would execute plaintiffs' trades in a manner maximizing 
plaintiffs' economic gain--was at least reckless, if not 
intentional. See Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Penn., Inc., 
616 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 1980) (defining recklessness as 
an extreme departure from ordinary care).  
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Defendants have countered with affidavits of other 
respected members of the brokerage community stating 
that their practice during the class period was the same as 
that of the defendants. This evidence could, of course, be 
regarded by a trier of fact as probative of the defendants' 
state of mind when they accepted plaintiffs' orders. But 
these affidavits do no more than raise a material issue of 
fact as to whether the defendants knew of the expectation 
plaintiffs claim to have had; they do not settle the matter. 
 
At trial, the defendants would certainly be entitled to 
argue to the jury that, because of industry practice, they 
thought their clients would expect them to execute only at 
the NBBO or that they never thought about their clients' 
expectations. Moreover, any evidence, derived from 
knowledge of industry practice or elsewhere, that the 
plaintiffs were generally aware of the defendants' exclusive 
reliance on the NBBO would, of course, be quite probative 
of whether the plaintiffs had the expectations they claim. 
But the defendants, in elevating the practice of a segment 
of the industry to be outcome determinative, lose sight of 
the fact that the basis for the duty of best execution is the 
mutual understanding that the client is engaging in the 
trade--and retaining the services of the broker as his agent 
--solely for the purpose of maximizing his own economic 
benefit, and that the broker receives her compensation 
because she assists the client in reaching that goal. Based 
on this mutual understanding and the absence of any 
express limitations on the brokers' responsibility, a trier of 
fact could find that the defendants, although intending to 
execute with sole reference to the NBBO, understood that 
they were expected to utilize sources other than the NBBO 
when a better price was readily available.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The foregoing analysis is generally applicable to plaintiffs' claim 
that 
it was reasonably feasible for defendants to "cross" customer orders on 
opposing sides of a transaction and match customer orders with in- 
house limit orders. Plaintiffs' record support, including affidavits from 
respected members of the investment community, raises a disputed 
issue of material fact as to whether these practices were reasonably 
feasible during the class period. If the defendants intended to execute 
plaintiffs' orders at the NBBO despite the reasonable availability of 
these 
alternative pricing sources, and if the defendants acted knowingly or 
with reckless indifference to the falsity of their material 
representations, 
then plaintiffs have a securities fraud claim for these practices as well. 
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V. 
 
In concluding as we do, we are not unmindful of the fact, 
deemed determinative by the district court, that execution 
of customer orders at the NBBO was a practice "widely, if 
not almost universally followed" in the securities industry 
during the class period. 911 F. Supp. at 772. Under the 
district court's logic, a Section 10(b) defendant would be 
entitled to summary judgment even if it were her regular 
practice to knowingly violate the duty of best execution, so 
long as she could identify a sufficient number of other 
broker-dealers engaged in the same wrongful conduct to be 
able to argue in good faith that the underlying duty was 
"ambiguous." We cannot accept an analysis that would 
produce such a result. 
 
Even a universal industry practice may still be 
fraudulent. See Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co. , 438 F.2d 
1167, 1171-72 (2d Cir. 1970) (non-disclosure of widespread 
industry practice may still be non-disclosure of material 
fact); Opper v. Hancock Securities Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 
676 (S.D.N.Y.) (industry custom may be found fraudulent, 
especially on first occasion it is litigated) aff 'd, 367 F.2d 
157 (2d Cir. 1966); see also Vermilye & Co. v. Adams 
Express Co., 88 U.S. 138, 146 (1874). Indeed, the SEC 
recently completed an investigation in which it found that 
certain practices by NASDAQ market makers, not at issue 
here, were fraudulent even though they were widely 
followed within the industry. See Report of Investigation 
Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 Regarding the NASD and the NASDAQ Market, 1996 
SEC LEXIS 2146 (Aug. 8, 1996). 
 
As defendants emphasize, the practice of exclusive 
reliance on the NBBO has never been held to be fraudulent 
by any court or regulator. On the other hand, there is no 
statute, rule, regulation, or interpretation, by the SEC or by 
a court, that authoritatively establishes that, for all trades, 
the NBBO exhausted the category of "reasonably available 
prices" during the class period. This absence of precedent 
did not, however, absolve the district court of the duty to 
resolve the plaintiffs' securities fraud claim once it was 
presented in this suit. 
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"In the final analysis, ultimate responsibility for 
construction and enforcement of the securities laws must 
rest with the court." Langert v. Q-1 Corp. , Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) P 94,445, at 95,540, 1974 WL 377 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 
1974). The district court was not deprived of this 
enforcement authority just because no court or regulator 
had previously chosen to exercise such authority with 
respect to the practice challenged here. See, e.g., Chasins, 
438 F.2d at 1171-72 (finding that defendant's failure to 
disclose its market maker status was material omission 
under Section 10(b), despite fact that SEC had never 
previously held that such disclosure was required). 
 
VI. 
 
On the record before us, we believe a reasonable trier of 
fact could conclude that the defendants misrepresented 
that they would execute the plaintiffs' orders so as to 
maximize the plaintiffs' economic benefit, and that this 
misrepresentation was intentional or reckless because, at 
the time it was made, the defendants knew that they 
intended to execute the plaintiffs' orders at the NBBO price 
even if better prices were reasonably available. A reasonable 
trier of fact could thus find scienter with respect to a 
material misrepresentation, as well as the other elements 
essential to a Section 10(b) fraud claim. Accordingly, we will 
reverse the summary judgment entered by the district court 
and remand for further proceedings. 
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       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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